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From the BSU to the BSEC
Evaluating Interwar Geopolitical Fantasies
Ostap Kushnir
This study charts the political, cultural and economic foundations of two 
inter-governmental bodies intended to emerge in the Black Sea region: 
the first, the Black Sea Union (bsu) was an idea developed by Ukrainian 
geopolitical specialist Yuriy Lypa before World War ii. The second is the 
current Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (bsec) 
launched in 1992. By comparing these bodies, this research pursues 
three key goals: first, it traces the succession of ideas between the eras of 
the bsu and the bsec and shows the existence of a specifically interwar 
mode of geopolitical thinking. Second, it highlights and explains the 
differences between the bsu’s geopolitical objectives and their actual 
implementation in the bsec. Finally, this work assesses current Ukrainian 
policies and perspectives in the Black Sea region. 
Keywords: Yuriy Lypa, Black Sea Union, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 
Eastern Europe, interwar geopolitics
Introduction
When considering Ukraine’s membership of different international 
organisations, political scientists often underestimate the role of the 
Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (bsec). It is difficult 
to find mention of this organisation in the documents defining Ukraine’s 
strategic objectives and the public speeches of state authorities. This 
may seem strange since Ukraine entered the bsec in 1992, a year after 
gaining its independence, making the bsec one of the first organisations 
to be joined by the new state. Moreover, Ukraine has since shown itself 
to be an important – if not the decisive – actor in the Black Sea region, 
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and the bsec could provide a means for the country to boost its political 
clout with the assistance of its allies.
The Black Sea region has been growing in significance since the end 
of the Cold War. This is primarily because the eastern borders of nato 
and the eu have stretched along the Black Sea shores since Romania and 
Bulgaria entered nato in 2004 and the eu in 2007; Turkey meanwhile 
had been a nato member since 1952. The region’s good governance, 
stability and prosperity are therefore of crucial interest to Western states. 
Secondly, many pipelines that transport oil and gas from the Caspian 
fields to Europe run through the Black Sea states. While some may claim 
that the eu’s dependence on Caspian resources remains comparatively 
low, smooth-running oil and gas supplies have always been important 
to the economic sustainability of Western states.1 Thirdly, the Black Sea 
region creates a buffer zone between prosperous European states and 
the unstable Middle East region. As such, it is a key player in the fight 
against terrorism, separatism, aggressive nationalism, drug and weapon 
smuggling, illegal migration and other security challenges. Finally, the 
majority of Black Sea countries are seen as developing states with huge 
market potential, growing consumption demands and a cheap labour 
force; all this makes them attractive for international business. 
As of 2010, the bsec had twelve member states. Their combined pop-
ulation was around 350 million people, with 190 million living in the 
immediate Black Sea region.2 However, the core idea of the bsec as an 
inter-governmental entity is not brand new. One political scientist who 
advocated for it obstinately in the second quarter of the 20th century was 
the Ukrainian geopolitician Yuriy Lypa (1900-1944). He outlined the idea 
clearly in his books The Destination of Ukraine (1938) and The Black Sea 
Doctrine (1942), claiming that all states in the Black Sea region should 
unite in the Black Sea Union (bsu). He also offered economic, political, 
military and cultural justifications to prove the viability of his concept. 
Lypa had an impressive background and education. His father, Ivan 
Lypa served as the minister of religion and the minister of health in the 
1917-1921 Ukrainian governments (Tsentralna Rada and Dyrektoria), and 
the young geopolitician therefore had the chance to connect with the 
brightest Ukrainian intellectuals of his time. Between 1918 and 1920, he 
also studied law at Kamieniec-Podolski University in Ukraine. In 1922, 




which he graduated in 1928.3 Some sources suggest that around 1930, he 
was awarded a scholarship and spent several months studying in Great 
Britain.4 All this makes Lypa’s geopolitical views worth addressing in 
this research. This is especially true when we consider that the bsu he 
proposed shares many features with the current bsec. 
Put briefly, this study considers the prospects for inter-governmental 
organisations in the Black Sea region. To this end, it has three aims: 1) 
to describe and assess the bsec’s geopolitical position in the modern 
globalised world, 2) to trace the connection between the bsu and the bsec 
by revealing and comparing key objectives common to these entities and 
3) to evaluate the bsu concept critically from a historical standpoint. It 
is important to stress the difficulties inherent in comparing an existing 
inter-governmental body such as the bsec with the bsu, which was halt-
ed as a half-finished idea between the wars. The grounds for the bsec’s 
existence and operations have been substantiated by many politicians 
and economists while the bsu concept was posited and cherished by 
just one man. The bsec, being rooted in reality, has embraced the Black 
Sea region’s diversity and contradictions while the bsu was tied to naive 
expectations and misguided simplifications. Finally, the bsu concept 
had numerous gaps and shortcomings, but the bsec was built to be a 
coherent and functional entity. 
Distinguishing Features of the BSEC and the BSU 
In 1990, (then) Turkish president Turgut Özal announced plans to create 
an inter-governmental entity in the Black Sea region. His preliminary 
name for this body was the Black Sea Area of Prosperity and Cooperation. 
It was supposed to embrace four states: the ussr, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey. Two years later, on 25 June 1992, eleven countries (Azer-
baijan, Armenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, 
Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, the majority emerging after the ussr’s 
dissolution) signed a declaration that launched official international 
cooperation in the Black Sea region. This declaration is better known 
today as the Bosphorus Statement. It contained several objectives, which 
were, however, formulated vaguely. In particular, the presidents of the 
member states agreed to:
1. strive for peace, stability and development in the region, realise 




putes according to the principles set out by the Commission on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (csce) (now the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce)), 
2. resist aggression, violence, terrorism and lawlessness so as to help 
establish and restore peace and justice,
3. transform the Black Sea into a region of peace, freedom, stability 
and prosperity and
4. facilitate the processes and structures of European integration.5
Before the Bosphorus Statement, other early drafts had maintained 
that the organisation should become a kind of customs union ensuring 
the free movement of goods, services and capital regardless of borders. 
To make this possible, the member states agreed to invest in improve-
ments in transport, communication and security infrastructure in the 
region. These investments were to be managed by individual member 
states with no rigorous central coordination.6
With the adoption of the Yalta Charter on 05 June 1998, the group 
became a full-fledged regional economic entity and acquired its official 
name – the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. 
Since the start of the 21st century, bsec member states have boasted 
significant economic growth which is among the most dynamic in the 
world. According to the data provided by Tarlopov, the total market 
capacity of the region was us$1.6 trillion in 2009 with trade capacity 
of us$300 billion.7 On the other hand, the region’s financial potential 
has ultimately been less impressive from a global perspective: the 
above-mentioned us$300 billion represented only 4.5% of the world’s 
trade capacity.8 
Along with the twelve member states (Serbia joined in April 2004), 
the bsec now includes seventeen observers and seventeen sectoral 
dialogue partners. The member states differ in terms of their size, pop-
ulation, economic development, political systems and military power. 
These differences produce significant asymmetries. For instance, 83% 
of the bsec’s gdp is generated by three states – the Russian Federation, 
Turkey and Greece. In turn, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Moldova are responsible for just 1% of the gdp in total. The asymmetries 
also contribute to the rivalry between the larger member states which 
are vying for bsec leadership; Russia and Turkey are evidently keen to 
increase their power and gain political control over the other states.9 The 




several bsec member states are also full members of other international 
organisations such as the eu, cis, guam, cefta, oic, eco, D-8, G-20 and 
eec.10 In sum, asymmetries, diversity and conflicts of interests are what 
characterises the bsec today; they are also clearly what hampers the 
relations among its member states. 
On 26 June 2012, the bcec set new priorities during its most recent 
summit in Istanbul. This time, the leaders of the member states un-
dertook to:
1. contribute to enhancing peace, stability, security, dialogue and 
prosperity in the region,
2. substantially increase intra-bsec trade and investments and further 
promote public-private partnerships,
3. incorporate environmental approaches into economic and social 
development programmes,
4. enhance coordination and interaction among bsec-related bodies 
and affiliates,
5. increase gender equality and women’s participation in economic 
and political processes,
6. deepen cooperation in the spheres of culture, tourism and youth 
policy and
7. establish a strategic relationship between the bsec and the eu.11
If we compare the 2012 priorities with those adopted twenty years 
ago, we can find virtually no significant changes. To be sure, several new 
issues appeared on the 2012 list which had not been in focus in 1992. 
These were, in particular, gender, the environment, tourism, exchanges 
among youth, good governance and public-private partnerships. Never-
theless, the stress remained on improving the business climate and eu 
cooperation as the indisputable priorities. To achieve the 2012 priorities, 
a roadmap was sketched out. This was the ‘The bsec Economic Agenda 
– Towards an Enhanced bsec Partnership.’
However, the parallels between the 1992 and 2012 agenda also prompt-
ed another more cynical conclusion: the declared ambitions of bsec 
member states has always been high on rhetoric but low on achievement. 
Their joint efforts had borne little fruit in twenty years. At any rate, no 
customs union had been created, and there is little chance of one coming 
into being in the near future. 
In contrast, the idea of the bsu originated with Lypa on the eve of wwii. 




existed no clear vision regarding the shape of the postwar world or the 
place the Eastern European states would have within it. Lypa, however, 
looked to the future enthusiastically; he wrote that the states located on 
the Black Sea shores should create a genuine union and so transform the 
sea into an internal lake.12 Membership of that union was to be granted 
to Ukraine, Turkey, the Caucasus republics (Kuban, Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan), Bulgaria and Romania. Lypa also strongly believed that 
the ussr (or “Russia,” as he continued to call it) was doomed to dissolve 
after the war and that this would bring independence to all of its Black 
Sea republics. After that dissolution, Russia would be expelled from the 
region and, most likely, erased from the world map. 
To illustrate the uniqueness and self-sufficiency of the Black Sea region, 
Lypa used a fascinating analogy: this region was, he said, like a fortress. 
The Black Sea lay at the centre of the fortress. Its eastern walls were the 
Caucasian states stretching all the way to the Caspian Sea and Volga River. 
On the other side, its western walls ran along the Carpathian mountain 
range and the borders of the Balkan states. This fortress also had three 
gates: the Danube, the Caspian Sea and the Bosphorus. Turkey was said 
to be the fortress’s base while Ukraine was its vault.13 The solidity of the 
fortress, according to Lypa’s calculations, was to be ensured through 
the mutually beneficial cooperation of Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey.
In his books, Lypa described the bsu as a political, cultural and econom-
ic union. The majority of ties with its eastern and western neighbours 
should be suspended, he argued; the only reasonable and profitable way 
for the bsu to develop was by promoting North-to-South cooperation. 
The economic system of the union would be closed and nationalistic. 
Lypa claimed that all strategic industries should be owned and supported 
by the region’s nation states with no foreign investment allowed (unless 
it came from other bsu members). He was also certain that the Black 
Sea region should be forged from within; any assistance from abroad or 
cooperation with third countries would be a security threat. To ensure 
that closed national economies were sufficient, Lypa advocated for 
the creation of a customs union: ‘A customs union of Black Sea states 
will firmly and durably unite several dozen Black Sea peoples into one 
national household. Now is the time for large national households.’14 
Addressing the union’s political objectives, Lypa claimed that a strong 
bsu would ensure that its member states were protected from external 




Russia, Britain, France and Italy and their territorial claims. As may 
be recalled, Britain had deployed significant numbers of troops in the 
Cyprus-Haifa-Suez triangle during the interwar period; France had oc-
cupied Syria and much of the Middle East; Italy had built its strongest 
naval base on the Dodecanese islands near the Turkish mainland while 
Russia was aggressively re-routing the flow of people and goods from 
Ukraine to its land in the north-east. As well as protecting against these 
external threats, political unification would make it possible to solve the 
problem of internal instability. Since the early 20th century, tensions 
had regularly played out in the relations between the Bulgarians and the 
Turks, the Armenians and the Turks, the Bulgarians and the Romanians, 
the Georgians and the Kubanians, the Azeris and the Armenians, to name 
some of these conflicts. Common authority at inter-state level would 
contribute to greater peace in the region. Moreover, the political union 
of the Black Sea states would change the way that they were positioned 
in the world. According to Lypa, at the beginning of the 1940s, none of 
the Western or Eastern powers gave much credit to these states, which 
were seen traditionally as colonial annexes with no defined national 
objectives.15 Creating the bsu could, thus, send a strong message to the 
international community about the maturity of the Black Sea region. 
In sum, Lypa advocated for the following objectives for the bsu:
1. political and economic unification and the subsequent transfor-
mation of the Black Sea into an internal lake,
2. nationalisation of strategic industries and the adopting of economic 
nationalism by every state in the union,
3. organised resistance to pressures and territorial claims from third 
countries,
4. recovery from colonial dependencies and joint development of a 
regional economy,
5. creation of a customs union to ensure free trade within the bsu 
and
6. peaceful settlement of internal conflicts. 
It may be observed that these objectives hardly fit with the interwar 
realities; in fact, they revealed Lypa’s unrealistic expectations rather 
than reflecting the true balance of power in the 1940s. In drawing up 
his objectives, the geopolitician had a tendency to overestimate political, 
economic and social conditions in line with his own viewpoints and to 




the assumption that the ussr would lose its territorial integrity as an in-
disputable truth; he also never doubted that the newly formed post-Soviet 
states would forge a bloc notwithstanding any possible disagreements 
among them. In light of these and other ideas, we might conclude that 
Lypa was a pseudo-scientist generating theoretical abstractions. This 
might be true were it not for the fact that several of his findings appear 
pragmatic and rational; moreover, some even came into being as bsec 
objectives at the beginning of 21st century. These and other observations 
mean that Lypa’s idea warrants a more profound examination. 
Comparing the Economic Objectives of the  
BSU and the BSEC
Looking closely at the ‘bsec Economic Agenda - Towards an Enhanced 
bsec Partnership’ roadmap, we find a genuine effort to set out guidelines 
for action along with objectives for strengthening the bsec and strategic 
organisational goals. The latter – of which there are seventeen in total – 
are in line with the recent Istanbul Summit Declaration and reflect the 
current economic interests of Black Sea states. The following targets 
may be seen as most important:
1. intensified intra-regional trade and investments,
2. cooperation in customs and border-crossing administration,
3. creation of an efficient transport network,
4. development of sustainable energy and the Black Sea energy market,
5. environmental protection and conservation ,
6. food security and safety,
7. support for sustainable development of the sme sector,
8. tourism development and cultural heritage protection,
9. cooperation in banking and finance and
10.combating of organised crime, illicit trade in drugs and weapons, 
terrorism, corruption and money laundering.16
These goals also determine the steps that the bsec should, and prob-
ably will, take for its further development. Comparing them to the bsu 
objectives can provide a sufficient assessment of the depth of Lypa’s 
geopolitical thought. This approach, moreover, can highlight the se-
quence of key ideas. 
In considering the economic self-sufficiency of the bsu, Lypa calculated 




solely by drawing solely on the resources (mineral deposits, soil, rivers 
and populations) available in Black Sea states. In fact, the majority of his 
calculations hold true in the region today and can be used to illustrate 
why the bsec’s operation is reasonable. According to the Ukrainian 
geopolitician, hard coal could be extracted from the Donbass (1940s 
reserves were estimated at 5 billion tonnes), crude oil could be pumped 
from the valleys (reserves around this time were approx. 6,400 million 
tonnes) and manganese, copper and iron could be excavated in central 
Ukraine and southern Turkey. Rivers could also ensure hydroelectricity 
production; their potential was estimated at 8,760,000 hp. This would 
meet the union’s energy demands. In turn, he noted that crops, fruit 
and vegetables could easily be cultivated in the black-coloured soil; the 
quantity of food produced would be enough to feed the whole population 
of the Black Sea region.17 
Like today’s bsec members, Lypa also maintained the Black Sea 
region’s capacity to support the rapid transport of goods, people and 
services between its member states. Lypa claimed that such transpor-
tation should occur mainly via Black Sea routes and river systems. In 
the 1940s, the region featured more than fifty river ports equipped to 
moor and handle large vessels – this was without even considering its 
sea ports.18  Current bsec leaders add that land routes have significant 
potential and should be used simultaneously with sea routes. Several 
provisions of the bsec roadmap, thus, stress the need to complete the 
Black Sea Ring Highway.19  The latter is set to be some 7250 kilometres 
long, extending to the Black Sea shores with numerous branches and 
running deep into the territories of the member states. At this juncture, 
however, only Turkey has managed to complete its part of the highway. 
When it comes to the matters of reduced customs tariffs and open 
borders, bsec leaders have always stressed the importance and admin-
istrative aspects of these goals. Lypa, on the other hand, paid them 
minimal attention. Understanding open borders as an obvious and 
immanent part of the bsu, he claimed that these borders would emerge 
automatically as the bsu came into being. As such, he did not focus 
much on the restrictions imposed by sovereignty or under international 
agreements with third countries. Indeed, such restrictions simply did 
not exist from his perspective. 
Regarding cultural issues in the region, we may note the shared sensi-




It is evident from the current bsec roadmap that the organisation’s goals 
in the cultural sphere are today very business-oriented. They include, 
for instance, promoting the Black Sea region as one of the world’s 
leading tourist destinations, launching research on common heritage 
and preserving cultural diversity. No other cultural cooperation can be 
launched successfully within the bsec due to the differences in religion, 
behaviour, traditions, history and geopolitical identifications among the 
member states; this is, at any rate, how the bsec leaders see the situa-
tion. Lypa, in contrast, was never concerned with such differences, but 
instead advocated for cultural cohesion, aiming to encourage a deeper 
socialisation of those living in the region. Writing on cultural issues, 
he stressed the common maritime outlook, historic success of joint 
actions and the existing threats which undermined national identities. 
The people of the Black Sea area, he argued, were characterised by their 
blind love of adventure, endeavours and discoveries.20 At the same time, 
he appealed broadly to the idea of cultural justice. Black Sea regional 
culture had been oppressed for a long time, he claimed. As such, after 
the bsu was created, nothing should stop it from dramatically expanding 
and gaining global influence.21
Turning to the issue of energy security, we can make out only minor 
similarities between the bsu and the bsec. Again, this can be explained 
by Lypa’s overestimation of the region’s cohesion. In contrast, today’s 
bsec member states, especially those exporting oil and gas, perceive one 
another as rivals. This rivalry is intensified by irresolvable ethnic and 
political conflicts such as the ones over Nagorno-Karabah and South 
Ossetia. Russia remains the biggest and most influential player in the 
region, and smaller states like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey and 
Romania struggle to achieve any profits from exports. This contributes 
to a hidden geopolitical war inside the bsec with no possibilities for 
intervention by inter-governmental institutions to decrease tensions. 
Instead, smaller states are attempting to ensure their interests and 
self-sufficiency by constructing pipelines that bypass Russia. One such 
pipeline which already exists and transports Caspian gas to European 
markets, is the South Caucasus or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum link. A second 
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) route transports crude oil from the Caspian to the 
Mediterranean seas, bypassing not only Russian, but also Armenian and 
Iranian territories.22 A third line, the White Stream or Supsa-Constanţa, 




The Kremlin has responded in turn with its own plans for the Blue 
Stream or Izobilnoye-Beregovaya-Durusu–Ankara pipeline and the 
South Stream, which will connect Anapa with Pleven through Varna; the 
latter pipeline is expected to be in use by 2015, a year before the White 
Stream is ready.23 Looking at Lypa’s interpretation of energy issues, what 
is most striking is his comparative optimism and ignorance of regional 
tensions. The Ukrainian analyst gladly noted the abundance of mineral 
deposits in the Caucasus, which was for him an additional argument 
for the economic self-sufficiency of the bsu. Oil deposits near Grozny 
and Baku, he estimated, were very substantial and he held them to be 
rich in octane. The only pre-war pipelines that he mentioned were 
Armavir-Rostov, Armavir-Tuapse, and Baku-Batumi running through 
Dagestan and Kuban.24  No new pipeline routes were sketched out. Lypa 
also noted that the oil near Baku was a major reason for interventions 
by third countries in the internal policies of Azerbaijan.25 Still, he said 
nothing precise about the mechanisms for exporting resources abroad 
– to Europe, for instance. In fact, Lypa’s work simply did not focus on 
international trade. 
Regarding the sustainable development of the sme sector, bsec au-
thorities today call for the promoting of favourable conditions for 
local businesses and foreign investment. They also propose facilitating 
networking and exchanges of experiences and know-how, organising 
training for young entrepreneurs and other relevant steps.26 Lypa sup-
ported virtually the same goals with the notable exception of promoting 
foreign investment. Such investment, he argued, would not contribute 
to the development of national industry but only lead to the enrichment 
of investors and some local administrators; plus there was the growing 
security threat to consider. In his writing about the sme sector, the 
geopolitician also advocated for the revival of “natural” forms of Black 
Sea entrepreneurship. National and international policies on small and 
medium-sized companies, he argued, should supportthe emergence n 
of zadrugas (family businesses), artiles (small businesses with a narrow 
niche that were usually composed of several zadrugas) and cooperatives 
(medium-sized companies consisting of several artiles).27 As such, not 
only transparent business relations, but also interpersonal solidarity 





No clear environmental and gender issues are discussed in Lypa’s 
works since these matters were not of significant concern in the 1940s. 
His only mention of women’s social role related to the preservation and 
transfer of national traditions. Lypa argued that women might become 
good politicians, social activists or even soldiers, but they were not born 
to take on these roles. On the other hand, he noted that women and 
men usually enjoyed equal rights in societies in the Black Sea region 
and that particularly in Ukraine, these societies were historically ma-
triarchal; women had a prominent social role because they kept their 
families strong.28 Though some may claim today that such statements 
are sexist, they reflect gender equality as it was understood in the second 
quarter of the 20th century. 
Unlike current bsec leaders, Lypa was not particularly interested in 
the issue of food security. He considered the Black Sea region to be suf-
ficiently fertile to feed all its inhabitants; just the agricultural facilities in 
Ukraine, he claimed, were sufficient to satisfy internal demands for food.29 
To increase land fertility, the geopolitician advised launching policies 
to attract private industrial investors. This would not only lead to more 
efficient production, but also strengthen the economic reliability and 
military capacities of bsu member states.30 He did not, however, describe 
any precise mechanisms to achieve these ends: it was not clear how to 
redirect private investment into agriculture or how to draw economic 
and military benefits from food overproduction. 
Finally, Lypa was silent on the issues of banking cooperation and 
organised crime. On the first count, this was because the banking sector 
was exceedingly weak in the Black Sea region in the interwar period. On 
the second, organised crime was not perceived as a substantial threat. 
All in all, Lypa did not provide any substantial economic calculations, 
programmes or roadmaps in his books; instead, he appealed to existing 
economic opportunities and the natural resources of the Black Sea region, 
holding that these might potentially bring the states located there a new 
global status. These opportunities remain valid even at the beginning of 
the 21st century. Abundant natural resources, fertile soil, the vast size of 
the population, convenient communication and transport systems and 
an  entrepreneurial spirit – all these things may contribute significantly 
to living standards in bsec member states. Nevertheless, Lypa argued 




practical inter-governmental management were of absolute importance. 
This is something that bsec leaders are still not fully inclined to accept; 
they are only prepared to consider select issues of a political nature at 
an inter-state level. As it turns out, some of these issues were also noted 
by Lypa as bsu objectives. 
Political Foundations of the BSU:  
Measuring Lypa’s Romanticism
If we are to believe Lypa, Ukraine, Turkey and Bulgaria were all destined 
to create the political body of the bsu. The three states had experienced 
deep interconnection throughout history; they also shared the same 
outlook and treated one another with respect. The minor tensions 
which existed between them in the 1940s would be resolved promptly 
and peacefully in the name of future prosperity, he said. Turning to 
the political leader of the Ukraine-Turkey-Bulgaria triumvirate, Lypa 
claimed that only Ukraine could succeed with this responsibility. In 
his view, Ukrainians were less inclined to adopt arbitrary political de-
cisions than Bulgarians and Turks; they favoured a rational approach to 
governance. As proof, Lypa pointed out that Ukrainian administrative 
geniuses and intellectuals enjoyed high regard among the rulers of 
neighbouring states. For example, he claimed that the descendants of 
the Rozumovskyi, Suvorov, Kochubei and Paskevych noble lines were 
known in medieval and modern Europe as the brightest administrators 
within the Russian states.31
On the roles of the bsu member states, Lypa argued that Turkey 
would become the Union’s stronghold in the Middle East, Ukraine 
would emerge as a liberator of the Caucasus (leading to the unifying of 
fragmented republics) and Bulgaria would secure the Union’s Balkan 
interests.32  As a Christian state, Bulgaria would also assist Ukraine in 
counterbalancing any eventual political fluctuations in Turkey. Under a 
single leadership, the three states were meant to pacify the territories at 
the bsu’s border with each of one taking care of its own neighbourhood. 
This would help the union to withstand external pressures from the 
Russian, British, French, German and Italian sides. The military units 
of Bulgaria and Turkey would be capable of achieving these objectives 
with some rearmament and training.33
Focusing particularly on Turkey and Ukraine – set to become two 




ed one another frequently and constructively throughout history. We 
may recall here the Turkish assistance to the Cossack Hetmans in their 
wars against the Poles and Muscovites; the Turkish support for the 
Cossacks after the destruction of Zaporozhian Sich in 1774; the Cossack 
participation in Ottoman military campaigns; Turkey’s recognition of 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919 (it was in fact the first state to 
recognise upr); Turkish agreements with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic 
and other examples.34 Moreover, Lypa claimed that these two states were 
naturally predisposed to cooperate with one another: Turkey’s biggest 
mineral resource deposits and most developed industrial districts were 
located in the north of the country while the Ukrainian equivalents 
were mainly in the south. The Black Sea was the only barrier between 
the Turkish and Ukrainian industrial areas. 
Addtionally, Turkey and Ukraine also shared ancient traditions of 
profitable sea trade. This reached its historical zenith in 1649 when a 
trade convention was signed between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the 
Ottoman Empire granting Cossack vessels the right to free movement 
on the Black Sea. This document consisted of 13 articles and entitled the 
Cossacks to trade tax-free on Turkish territory for the next 100 years.35 In 
fact, this was first customs union in the Black Sea region and its positive 
example, described by Lypa, can be seen as the blueprint for the bsu. 
People living on the Anatolian peninsula had always needed access to 
northern markets and vice versa. This is clear from the very existence of 
a medieval trading route between the Varangians and the Greeks which 
connected the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. In Lypa’s time, Turkey 
was interested in exporting wool and cattle to the north and importing 
Ukrainian cotton, steel and machinery.36 The geopolitician advocated 
strongly for the preservation of the North-to-South connection in the 
Black Sea region over the course of history. He claimed that this would 
not only enrich all states situated there, but strengthen the role of the 
region at a global level. 
Lypa also argued that Kyiv should become the capital of the bsu. 
There were several factors which predisposed the city to this role. First, 
Kyiv had a symbolic place in the Black Sea region, having accumulated 
cultural heritage and shaped political traditions for centuries. Secondly, 
it lay at the heart of the North-to-South trading routes. Thirdly, it was 
known as a centre of Christianity and was thus better placed to unite 
Christians living in the region than Istanbul, which had already become 




If we compare Lypa’s political visions with the current state of the 
Black Sea region, it is clear that the Ukrainian scholar was partly right. 
Demir notes that Ukrainian markets are currently filled with the prod-
ucts of Turkish light industries while Turkey remains one of the biggest 
importers of Ukrainian steel and scrap metals.38 The same is true of 
inter-state investment: Turkish entrepreneurs are willing to develop 
Ukrainian industries, focusing especially coal extraction near the Black 
Sea shores; at the same time, Ukrainians are investing in Turkish recre-
ational facilities. The quantity of Black Sea trade is also growing though 
it remains significantly imbalanced with a clear predominance of raw 
materials and products with little value added.39 Finally, Ukraine can rely 
on Turkish support when it comes to the issues of oil and gas supplies. 
Turkey is interested in its northern neighbour as a reliable transit partner. 
and it is eager to develop joint energy projects. 
Even so, there are a number of issues which do not correspond to 
the patterns forecast by Lypa . One is the fact that Turkey plays a more 
important role in the Black Sea region than Ukraine does, with the bsec’s 
“capital” being located in Istanbul, and not in Kyiv. Turkey is the initia-
tor and coordinator of the Black Sea For programme, which addresses 
common security, rescue and search activities in the Black Sea and also 
trains the military to help civilian vessels in need. Bulgaria, Romania, 
Ukraine, Russia and Georgia are all participating states. Black Sea Har-
mony is another Turkish initiative in which Russia and Ukraine have 
some involvement. The main programme objective is the interception 
of suspicious vessels to prevent terrorist activity at sea and secure the 
straits. Russia is a crucial partner here, making it a second active player 
in the region. In contrast, Ukraine can hardly be said to be interested in 
southward expansion. It possesses no clear strategy regarding Black Sea 
policies and is bandwagoning between powers in the East and the West, 
and not those in the North and the South where it claims to be neutral.40
Returning to the matter of the Russian (eventually Soviet) presence 
in the Black Sea region, Lypa maintained that this should be minimised 
or even terminated. In his view, Russia’s interests and the arrogant ways 
that they were promoted undermined natural trading patterns in the 
region. The geopolitician wrote that Russia had never been comfortable 
on the Black Sea shores: its exports and trade there were very weak and 
risky due to its inability to control all the players there.  In 1896, 92.5% of 




by 1911, the situation had improved slightly for Russia with foreign vessels 
constituting 86.1% of moored ships. Lypa attributed the imbalance to 
the Kremlin’s disastrous policy on tariffs and trade; transporting goods 
from one Black Sea port to another was, he noted, as costly as sending 
them from the port to Great Britain. It was similarly more expensive 
to transport coal from the Donets Basin to the Black Sea ports than to 
send it to the Baltic ports ten times further away.41 
According to Lypa, Russia’s aggressive behaviour towards the Caucasus 
contributed to the instability and insecurity in the region. The geopol-
itician wrote that such brazen attempts to conquer and administer the 
mountainous republics had undermined the ordinary lives of their native 
peoples and triggered significant turmoil. The same turmoil could be 
observed in the Ukrainian lands where public dissent had been brewing 
since 1918. Expelling Russia from the Black Sea region and restoring 
ancient lifestyles would significantly decrease tensions in the region. 
To achieve this goal, an independent Ukraine should gain control over 
all Soviet shores in the Black and Azov seas, Lypa argued.42 This control 
over the seas would significantly jeopardise Russian positions on land. 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that neither Ukraine nor any other 
state in the Black Sea region was in a position to achieve these objectives 
in 1940s, just as they do not they have much chance of accomplishing 
them today – if indeed they ever will. 
Assessing Lypa’s views on Russia means running into significant degrees 
of subjectivity and romanticism. The position of Russia, a 20th-century 
superpower could not be disregarded as easily as Lypa wished to do; its 
regional policies, which he labelled ‘disastrous,’ had after all managed to 
ensure the Kremlin’s interests in these lands over centuries. Moreover, 
Lypa never wrote about positive aspects of Russian’s presence on the 
Black Sea shores such as the region’s dramatic industrialisation and the 
increase in living standards. As of today, Russia, like Turkey, remains a 
key player in the region. Nothing threatens its dominance; moreover, 
it has incentives to acquire even more power.  Finally, if there emerges 
any threat which could weaken Russian presence in the region, this 
would undermine existing economic ties and the political status quo. 
The consequences could be devastating. 
In describing the Black Sea region, Lypa constantly stressed its co-
lonial status as perceived by the interwar superpowers. To fight off 




external dependencies along with the development of a closed economy. 
Cutting ties with the external world, however, had several significant 
drawbacks. These would become clear with time. Lypa did not take 
into consideration the shift that Western states had made from “hard” 
to “soft” power in their foreign policies, or the distinct pro-European 
orientation of several Black Sea states, especially Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Romania. The majority of the threats he saw as critical had ceased to exist 
after the Second World War and could be ruled out in later years. For 
instance, Turkey currently experiences no pressures from Britain, Italy 
and France at its borders; the Balkan and Central European states are 
no longer threatened by either the Russians or the Germans; a sovereign 
Ukraine also has means to oppose Russian influences. The truth is also 
that the Black Sea states are more willing to cooperate with “Western 
bullies” than they are willing to develop a self-sufficient inter-govern-
mental body in the Black Sea region. Again taking Turkey as an example, 
the rates of its exports to Germany and imports from South Korea are 
several times higher than those for its trade with Ukraine, its neighbour 
on the natural North-to-South axis.43 It is also worth highlighting that 
Turkey has already joined a customs union with the eu. 
The Black Sea region is of strategic importance for a united Europe 
today. No longer perceived as a colonial space, this area of 190 million 
citizens is instead seen as a huge market for the sale of goods and pro-
vision of services. On this basis, the region appears to be a player in 
European and Asian trade relations. In addition, it is rich in mineral 
resources, which are vital for the sustainability of Western economies. 
All this results in significant European engagement in promoting the 
economic predictability of the region, decreasing financial risks, com-
bating organised crime and terrorism, advancing good governance and 
developing oil and gas transport systems.44 When Romania and Bulgaria 
joined the eu in 2007, Brussels officials gained a legitimate foothold 
for their representation in the region, allowing them to promote eu 
strategic interests more efficiently. To facilitate bsec-eu cooperation, 
the special Black Sea Synergy programme was launched along with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. These developments point to a sig-
nificant deviation from Lypa’s theory: the bsec does not function as an 
independent entity; instead it is used by its member states as a means to 
cooperate with the eu.  bsec membership may also serve to accelerate 
the eu accession tracks of Turkey, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.45
Coming back to the cultivating of closed national economies, it can 




it may even be considered a disastrous strategy from the point of view 
of the underdeveloped states of 1940s. The evidence can be found in 
the present-day Black Sea region: Moldova and Georgia are two states 
with comparatively closed economies. On the one hand, this served to 
soften the severe impact of the 2008 world crisis and to preserve the 
growth of their gdp uninterrupted. On the other hand, these states are 
some of the poorest in Europe with no significant economic growth 
beyond their cities.46 This demonstrates that a closed economy never 
bears much fruit and would have been counterproductive to the bsu.
To summarise, several of Lypa’s expectations made his political the-
orising unrealistic. For a start, he overestimated the solidarity of the 
nations located in the Black Sea region. Not all of them were willing to 
establish genuine relations with one another and, most likely, not all of 
them would recognise Ukraine as a political leader. Secondly, he did not 
properly consider the post-war changes in Europe or the shift within 
Western states to liberalism and “soft” power. Thirdly, he underestimated 
the positions and policies of Russia, which was firmly entrenched in the 
Black Sea region. As such, Lypa’s idea of the bsu as a political union was 
not feasible. The current bsec, with its poor functionality and narrow 
economic outlook, is the best proof of this claim. 
Conclusions
It may be observed that despite their numerous similarities on a con-
ceptual level, the bsu and the bsec in fact had different objectives. In 
describing the bsu, Lypa was sure that: 
1. the Black Sea states had no option other than besides forming a 
political bloc to achieve prosperity,
2. that bloc would emerge notwithstanding any external oppression 
or internal disagreements, 
3. it would become culturally and ideologically homogeneous and
4. it was the only way for the colonised Black Sea states to ensure 
their independence and strengthen global role.
As an existing body, the bsec demonstrates that Lypa’s aims were not 
entirely valid for the region. This can be deduced from the following:
1. Black Sea states pursue different interests and are not inclined to 
pool their sovereign powers, 
2. these states clearly lack coherence and common understandings 
in their relations with one another, 




4. some Black Sea states put little stock in a strong bsec and instead 
use it as a tool to pursue alternative goals (for instance,  accelerating 
eu accession). 
The current balance of power in the region can also scarcely be defined 
as in line with Lypa’s predictions. Ukraine, which he argued would become 
a political leader, remains too weak and indifferent to unify the Black 
Sea states. Turkey and Bulgaria, supposed to become the major powers 
in the region along with Ukraine, remain sceptical about the creation 
of a triumvirate; the North-to-South axis is dysfunctional. In contrast, 
Russia continues to actively promote its interests disregarding Lypa’s 
claim that it should be ousted from the Black Sea shores. Finally, there 
has been no significant advance in the bsec objectives since 1993: little 
changed between the time of the Bosphorus Statement and the latest 
Istanbul Summit Declaration. In other words, Lypa’s ideas of political 
unification, deepening interdependence and the creation of a genuine 
bloc in the Black Sea region remain largely wishful thinking.
Ironically, it is the supposed Western bullies whom the geopoliti-
cian considered a critical threat which have started to set up the most 
constructive policies in the region. In this regard, we can point to the 
eu’s Black Sea Synergy programme, which aims to stimulate economic 
reforms, facilitate trade and further democratisation. The majority of 
the bsec states are currently far more interested in cooperating with 
the eu than among themselves. Moreover, Bulgaria and Romania have 
already joined the eu, thereby clearly demonstrating their strategic 
orientation; their activities within the bsec are now restricted by the 
European acquis communautaire. Finally, Western states no longer 
perceive the Black Sea region as a colony. Instead, they regard it as a 
massive market for the sale of their goods and services. 
The general romanticism in Lypa’s geopolitical thinking has been 
eloquently summed up by Dnistrianskyi: ‘In the context of his time ... he 
overestimated the value of anthropological factors in social and political 
processes [and he overstated] the uniqueness of Ukrainian cultural and 
historic traditions. His interpretation of ancient Ukrainian history is 
not purified through this mythologising.’47 If, however, we indulge the 
evident miscalculations, then we will also note the strengths in Lypa’s 
objectives. Updated and adjusted, these aims continue to be the impetus 
for the operation of the bsec today: 





2. they are working towards establishing a customs union and facil-
itating migration,
3. they plan to construct and maintain an efficient transport network 
including sea lanes and land routes,
4. they aim to increase food security and safety by developing the 
region’s agricultural potential and
5. they agree to exchange and trade natural resources with one another, 
thereby satisfying regional demands for oil, gas and coal
To conclude, despite the critical shortcomings in Lypa’s political 
theory, it is of significant historic value and highly innovative. It might 
even be said that the geopolitician was one of the spiritual founding 
fathers of the bsec. Entirely on his own, he worked out a sophisticated 
strategy for the dozens of Black Sea states on the eve of Second World 
War, and he published it under very harsh conditions.  It is likely that 
strategy would have been significantly improved if Lypa had lived for 
a longer time and continued his work after the war. He was, however, 
murdered by the nkvd in 1944.48 
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